ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

has been put to great costs and expenses: Cook v. Cook, 100
Mass. 194.
By special damage in such a case is meant pecuniary loss, but
it is well settled that the term may also include the loss of substantial hospitality of friends: Moore v. Meagher, I Taunt. 42;
Williams v. Hill, 19 Wend. 306.
Illustrative examples are given by the text 'writers in great
numbers, among which are loss of marriage, loss of profitable
employment or of emoluments, profits or customers, and it was very
early settled that a charge of incontinence against an unmarried
female, whereby she lost her marriage,was actionable by reason of
the special damage alleged and proved : Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Co.
16 b., pl. 11 : Ieston v. PomfreioLt, Cro. Eliz. 689.
Doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, but the special
damage must be alleged in the declaration and proved, and it is
not sufficient to allege that the plaintiff "has been damaged and
injured in her name and fame," which is alleged in that regard in
the case before the court: Hartley v. Herring, 8 Term 138:
Addison on Torts 805; Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill 309.
Tested by these considerations, it is clear that the decision of
the court below, that the declaration is bad in substance, is correct.
Judgment affirmed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1
2

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.$

ACTION.

See Foreign Judgment.

Judgment-Interference by Real party in Interest though not nominally on the Record-Statute of Limitations.-The real defendant who
pays a judgment against a nominal party, afterwards vacated, may recover in his own ntame the money so paid: Mann et al. v. The Etna
Insurance Co., 38 Wis.
Plaintiffs covenanted with A., S. & Co., for value, to discharge all
indebtedness and liabilities of the latter firm, indemnify it against an
1 From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 22 of his Reports.
2 From lion. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in vol. 69 Illinois Reports.
S From lion. 0. 11. Conovcr, Reporter; to appear in 38 Wisconsin Reports.
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action by the present defendant against it then pending in New York,
and pay any judgment which should be rendered against it therein.
On a judgment rendered against A., S. & Co. in that action, this defendant recovered a judgment in Wisconsin against that firm, which
was paid by plaintiffs, but afterwards vacated on their motion, for the
reason that the New York judgment had been reversed. hleld, that
such payment by plaintiffs was not a volrntay one, but one to which
they were bound by their cocenant; and they may recover from this defendant the amount so paid: Id.
This action for such recovery was commenced more than six years
after payment by plaintiffs of said Wisconsin judgment, but less than
six years after the reversal of the New York judgment. I1el, that it
was not barred by the statute, the cause of action not having accrued
until shch reversal : Id.
AD-%IIRALTY.
,mbmission of Litigated ,tdters to Arbitation-P,'ize.-Captors
(Admiral Farragut and others) having filed a libel in the admiralty fbr
prizes taken below New Orleans in April 1862, they and the government agreed to refer the cause to the "final determination and award"
of A., B., and C., "the award of whom," said the agreement of reference, "shall be final upon all questions of (wo and fact involved, said
award to be entered as a rule and decree of court in said case, with the
right also of either party to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, as fronb other decrees or judgments in

rize cases."

The arbitra-

tors made an award, finding certain matters wholly or chiefly of fact, and
also certain conclusions of law, and their award was, after exceptions to
it, made a decree of the court where the libel was filed.* An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court.
.Hed as principles of law applicable to the case:1. That there was nothing in the nature of the admiralty jurisdiction
or of an appeal in admiralty, which prevented parties in the Court of
Admiralty, whether sitting in prize or as an instance court, from submitting their case by rule of court to arbitration.
2. That the award in the present case was to be construed here and
its effect determined by the same general principles which would govern
it in a court of common law or of equity.
3. That notwithstanding the expression in the agreement of submission, that all questions of law in the ease were to be concluded by the
award, the agreement was in this respect no more than a submission of
all matters involved in the suit.
4. That accordingly where the award found facts, it was conclusive;
where it found or announced concrete propositions of law, unmixed with
facts, its mistake, if one was made, could have been corrected in the
court below, and could be corrected here; that where a proposition was
one of mixed law and fact, in which the error of law, if there was any,
could not be distinctly shown, the parties must abide by the award.
5. That the award was also liable, like any other award, to be set
aside in the court below, for such reasons as would be sufficient in other
courts; as for exceeding the power conferred by the submission, for
manifest mistake of law, for fraud, and for all other reasdns on which
awards are set aside in other courts of law or chancery : lnited States
v. Farragut,22 Wall.
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A

ENT.

Cannot act for both B uyer and Seller.-Where an agent employed
to sell property, sells the same to a purchaser for whom he is acting as
agent in effecting the purchase, the seller, in equity, may avoid the
contract: Fish v. Leser, 69 Ills.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.
BANKRUPTCY.

See Admiralty.

See Landlord and Tenant; Partnership.

Redemp ion of Land by Bankrupt after Sale for Taxes- Owner.Under a statute which enacts that the "owner." may within a time named
redeem land sold for taxes, a redemption may properly be made by a
person who has been decreed a bankrupt, the lands having been his.
In the case here before the court there had as yet been no appointment
of an assignee, nor assignment and conveyance to such person, as pro.
vided for in the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act of 1867; and
the redemption was made between the date of the decree and of such
appointment: Upthon v. Rouse, 22 Wall.
A charge that a person who had been decreed a bankrupt on his own
application had by such decree ceased to be owner and had lost the right
to redeem, teld to be erroneous ; there having been evidence tending to
show a redemption by such a person: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Promissoy .Note-Defence allowed wehere Plafaiff sues on Note as
Trusteefo" another.-Where the plaintiff in an action on a promissory
note is a mere trustee for another, the maker may avail hiniself of any
defence which he might set up against the real owner if the action had
been brought in his name: Belohradsky v. Kuhn, 69 Ills.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Release of Claim by State-Restrictioa on Legislative Powers.-The
provision of the Constitution of Missouri which ordains, "The General
Assembly shall have no power, for any purpose whatever, to release the
lien held by the state upon any railroad," a provision having reference
to the statutory liens held by the state on different railroads for the
credit of the state, lent to them by the issue of state bonds, the principal and interest of which the railroad companies were to pay-was not
meant: in case of a failure by the railroad companies, to prevent the
state from making a compromise with any railroad company of any debt
due to it or to become due; and on the compromise being effected to
release the lien: 1Voodson v. Murdoek et al., 22 Wall.
This view of the meaning of the clause is not altered by reading it in
the light of the constitutional ordinance, "for the payment of state and
railroad indebtedness," adopted at the same time as the state constitution, and as part of it, which ordinance, after providing for a sale by the
state of any railroad indebted to it, and for the possible case of a purchase by the state of the road, provides further for a sale of the road
after the state has so become owner, ordaining in such case, "That no
sale *** shall be made without reserving a lien upon the property and
franchises thus sold * * * for all sinus remaining due." This expression
is to be regarded not as having reference to what the railroad company

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

originally owed the state, that is to say, reference to the debt for which
the road was first sold, but to any portion of the purchase-money which
may remain unpaid upon a second sale; a sale by the state, after she
has become owner: Id.
The provision in the same constitution, "That no law enacted by the
General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall
be expressed in its title," is not violated by any act having various
details, provided they all relate to one general subject: I.
Hence, where an act was entitled, " An act for the sale of the Pacific
Railroad. and to foreclose the state's lien thereon, and to amend its
charter," held, that after certain sections providing for the sale, a section
providing that in certain contingencies no sale should be made, was not
a violation of the constitutional provision : _d.
CORPORATION.

Damages-Liabiltyfor ,ilalicious Assault by its Emploicye.-The
validity of ch. 273 ot 1874, so ftar as it prescribes maximum tolls for the
carriage of persons and property over the railways of this state, is no
longer an open question in this court: tIinckley v. The C., Mr.& St. P.
Railway Co., 38 Wis.
If, in removing plaintiff from defendant's train for his refusal to pay
a greater rate of toll than the maximum prescribed by said act, defendant's servants, in addition to the degree of force required for such
removal, made a malicious and aggravated assault on plaintiff, which
was either authorized or approved by defendant, it was a ease for cxemplary damages : rd.
Such an assault was alleged in the complaint and denied in the answer.
The jury found plaintiff's actual damages to be $600; but the verdict
and judgment in his favor was for $1000 damages. On defendant's
appeal, the bill of exceptions failed to set out all the evidence. Ieihl,
that the verdict must be presumed to have been warranted by the evidence : Id.
DAMAGES. See Corporations.
V'indictive-As against .ficipal Corporations.-Municipal corporations are not liable to vindictive or exemplary damages for personal
injuries growing out of mere neglect to keep a sidewalk in a safe condition. In order to justify such damages, the negligence of the authorities must be so gross as to be wilful: City of Chicago v. Kelly, 69 Ills.
Tre.pass- Vindictive Damages.-Where a person, on the commission
of a wrongful act, becomes liable only in consequence of his subsequent
approval or sanction of it, he will be liable only for the real injury
sustained, and will not be subject to vindictive damages: Grund v.
Van Vleck, 69 Ills.
DEED.

Delivery in, Escrow-Statute of Frauds.-The conditions upon which
an escrow was to be delivered to the grantee therein named, may rest in
parol and be proved by-parol: Campbell v. Thomas, 38 Wis.
When the person named as grantor still retains the right of control
over the deed, notwithstanding the deposit thereof with a third person,
it is not an escrow : Id.
VOL. XXIV.-32
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A deed deposited by the person named ther in as grantor, with a
third person, with instructions to deliver it to the person named as grantee. is not an escrow unless there is a valid contract of sale and purchase
between such granto~r and grantee : d.
In pur.suance or tlic terms of anloral agreement for the sale and pur.
chase of land, C. paid T. a small sum, on account of purChase-nonny,
and T. signed, sealed and acknowledged a deed of the land to C. (which
purported, by its own terms, to be fbr a consideration of $3000), ;.ntt
delivered it to II. with directions to deliver it t.o C. if the latter should. .
the second day thereafter, deposit with 11. his two notes for a certaii
sum (part of' the purchase-price), secured by a mortgage on the same
land, and pay to Il for T.'s use the balance of the price. Within the
time limited, C. offered to II. the notes, mortage and money requined
by the oral agreement; but II., by T.'s instructions, refused to deliver
to C. the deed, and T. at the same time tendered back to C. the money
already paid, and left it with II. for C. upon the refusal of the latter to
receive it. Iir an action by C. to compel a delivery of the deed to him
by 11 . Ikled, (1) That the oral agreement was void by the Statute of
Frauds. (2) That if the deed deposited with 11. had contained the
whole contract, it would have been a sufficient memorandum in writing
to answer the requirements of the statute. (3) That if the mortgage
had been drawn and signed by C. at the same lime that the deed was
signed byT., and deposited with the deed, the two instruments construed
together as a single contract, would probably have been a sufficient conpliance with the statute. (4) Tlit as there was no such contemporaneous execution or deposit of the mortgage, and as the deed does not
show a contract by which C. was to give his notes and a mortgage for a
part of the purchase-price (which is the contract alleged by him, and
upon which alone lie could maintain the action), there was no valid contract between the parties, the deed was not an escrow, aud it remained
subject, in 1I.'s hands, to the control of T. : Id.
EQUITY.
See Johit encants.
1P"actiee-Partiesto Bill.-In general, one who will be directly affected by a decree inequity, is a necessary party to the suit; and this
rule is departed from only when the parties are so numerous that coinpliance with it would be impossible or inconvenient. Where the grounds
of action averred against several defendants to a suit in equity arise out
of the same transaction or a series of transactions forming one course of
dealing and all tending to (ne end, the bill' is not multifarious : Spervisors of Douglass Co. v. 11'albridge and others, 38 Wis.

EsToPPEL.
-oldiny another out as the Owner of Party's Property.-Where the
owner of property holds out another, or allows him to appear as the owner
ol, or as having full power of disposition over the property, and innocent
parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner or person having the apparent power of disposition, they will be protected : Anderson
v. Armistead, 69 Ills.
FACTOR.

Fiduciary Character-Liabilityfor Misuse of P'roceeds of Sales.&-
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A commission merchhnt who sells goods for his consignors, even though
he guaranty the payment of the price, receives the proceeds of the sales
in afiduacimy capacity, and is liable to arrest in an action therefor, unless he has been authorized by his consignor to use such proceeds in his
own business : Williams Mower & Rea-per Co. v. Raynor, 38 Wis.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

Judgmentfounded on Judgment in another State-Reversalqf the latter-Recovery of Money paid bn former-.Laches.-Where a lNew York
judgment was reversed after a judgment founded thereon had been reidered in a court of Wisconsin, quxre, whether it was necessary to have
the latter judgment set aside before moneys paid upon it could be recovered of the plaintiff therein : Etna Insurance Co. v. Aldrich and others,
38 Wis.
If the order setting such judgment aside was unnecessary, it was
harmless, and affords the judgment plaintiff no ground of complaint
Id
As a general rule, none but parties to a judgment can have it set
aside : Id.
But where the znominal party to an action is not the real party in
interest, the latter is treated as having a standing in court, and nay
have control of the action : id
While the New York action against A., S. & Co. was pending, 3.
Bros., for value, covenanted with that firm to discharge all its indebtedness and liability, and indemnify it against said action and pay anyjudgment which should be rendered against it therein. After a judgment
against A., S. & Co. in said action had been affirmed by the New York
Court of Appeals, the cause was removed by writ of error to the Supreme
Court of the United States, but no supersedeas bond given, and that
court reversed the judgment. While the cause was pending in the
Federal court, judgment against A., S. & Co. was recovered in Wisconsin
upon the New York judgment, and was paid by 31. Bros. JleNl. that
tfhe latter were the real parties in interest as defendants, and entitled to a
hearing on their application to vacate the Wisconsin judgment: .Packard
v. Smith, 9 Wis. 184, distinguished : P.
A party is not chargeable with laches for failing to give a supersedeas
bond on suing out a writ of error; nor in this case can M. Bros be charged
with laches for neglecting to obtain a stay of proceedings in the Wisconsin action against A., S. & Co.; especially as the granting of such
a stay rests largely in the discretion of the court:* Id.
FOR3ER ADJUDICATION.

Judgment-Against Privies in Interest.-Where a party, whose goods
were insured in the name of another, with whom they were stored, after
a loss, agreed with the party insuring, that suit should be brought in
his name for the use of the owner, which was done, and prosecuted in
good faith, but on a trial the action was defeated without fault of the
nominal plaintiff, it was Held, that the owner of the goods, being a privy
in interest, was concluded by the judgment, and could not re-litigate the
matter in a suit against the party who had made the insurance, for an
alleged breach of his agreement to insure: Cole v, Favorite, 69 Ills.
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IIUS13AND AND WIFE.

TIfr mgay charge her Stparate Estate to pay IHsband's Debts.-It is
settled doctrine that a married woman may charge her separate property
for the payment of her husband's debt, by any instrument in writing in
which she in terms plainly shows her purpose so to charge it; she deseribing the property speeifieally and executing the instrument of charge
in the manner required by law : Stephen v. Beule et ux., 22 Wall.
INFANT.

Contract with-Relinquishment by Parent of right to Earnings.-A
minor, possessing the other legal qualifications, may, with the assent of
his flither, contract with a school board in this state to teach a school:
lfXonaqhan v. Schlw District _No. 1, 38 Wis.
The school law (ch. 101, Laws of 1872), seems to contemplate that
the contract in such a case shall be made with the teacher, and not with
the father : Id.
A father, by agreement with his minor child, may relinquish to the
latter the right which he would otherwise have to his services, and may
authorize those who employ him to pay him his wages, and will then
have no right to demand those wages either from the employer or from
the child : Id.
Plaintiff was present and assenting when his minor daughter entered
into a contract in writing with a school board, as teacher, which was
signed by her in her own name, and not by him. In the absence of
other proof of any intention on his part to relinquish his right to her
wages : Held, that he may maintain an action against the board forsuch
(unpaid) wages: Id.
-

INSURANCE.

Premises vacated without Nrotice according to Condition.-Where a
policy of insurance contained a condition Ithat the same should be void
in case the premises should become vacated, by the removal of the owner
or occupant, for more than thirty days, without notice to the company,
and its consent endorsed on the policy, and the premises were vacated
January 12th thereafter, and so remained until February 13th, when
they were destroyed by fire : Held, that the assured could not recover
for the loss: Hartford Fire Is. Co. v. Webster, 69 Ills.
JOINT TENANTS.

lfortgage by One---Parties to Bill to Redeem -Where one of four
joint tenants makes a deed of trust (a mortgage) of land conveyed to
the four-the deed of trust purporting to convey the whole estate-it is
not necessary, on a bill filed to have the land sold under the deed of
trust (in other words, to foreclose the mortgage), to make the three
who do not convey parties defendant to the bill: Stephen v. BeaU et vx;
22 Wall.
JUD. MENT. See Action; Foreign Judgment.
LACHES.
See Foreign ."dgnent; Trust.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Lien of Landlord for Rent before Levy-Bankruptcy.-Under the
Landlord and Tenant Act of Illinois, which enacts in its seventh section
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that : "In all cases 6f distress for rent it shall be lawful for the landlord, by himself, his agent, or attorney, to seize for rent any personal
property of is tenant that may be found in the county where such
tenant shall reside, and in no ease shall the property of 'any other
person, although the same may be found on the premises, be liable to
seizure for rent due from such tenant." And enacts in its eighth section that: "Every landlord shall have a lien upon the crops growing or
grown upon the demised premises in any year for rent that shall accrue
for such year." A landlord has no lien upon the personal property of his
tenant prior to an actual levy of distress : ilorgan v. Canpbell, Assignee, 22 Wall.
If proceedings of bankruptcy are begun by other persons against his
tenant before such warrant of distress be actually levied, the subsequent
assignment in bankruptcy, which assignment the fourteenth section of
the Bankrupt Act declares "shall relate back to the commencement of
said proceedings," and "by operation of law" vest in the assignee, the
title to all the bankrupt's property and estate, "although the same is
then attached on mesne process as the property of the debtor," will
vest the personal property of the tenant in the assignee, to the exclusion of the landlord's right to levy on it : Id.
It was the object of this fourteenth section to prevent any particular
creditor asserting any lien but such as existed when the petition in
bankruptcy was filed: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Action.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Damagai ; Railroad.
See Railroad.

Liability of Railroad Company for Injury to its Servants.-While it
is true that a common employer is not responsible to a servant for an injury caused by the negligence of his fellow-servant engaged in the same
line of employment, yet it is the duty of a railway company, as employer, to provide safe structures, competent employees and engines, and
all appliances necessary to the safety of the employed, and to adopt such
rules and regulations for running its trains as will insure safety, and,
having adopted them, to conform to them, or be responsible for consequences resulting from a departure from them: C. & Z I. Railway
I. Co. v. Taylor, 69 Ill.
Injury from Street Car and Plantlffi Negligent.-Where the plaintiff
is driving with his buggy upon a horse railway track when a car is approaching from the opposite direction toward him, at a short distance
and inplain sight, it is his duty to turn off the track to avoid a collision, and if he does not do so, through negligence or wilfulness, and a
collision ensues, he cannot recover against the railway company, even if
the latter was also in fhult, unless the company or its servants wilfully
causes the injury, or are guilty of such negligence or reckless conduct
as that the plaintiff's is slight when compared with it: Chicago IV D.
Railway Co. v. Bert, 69 Ill.
PARTNERSHIP.

Payment of Individual Debt-Bankruptcy of one Partner.-The
assignee in bankruptcy of the estate of an individual partner of a debtor
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copartnership, cannot maintain a suit to recover back money previously
paid to a creditor of the copartnership, upon the ground that the money
was paid to such creditor in fraud of the other creditors of the firm, and
in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. The suit should be by
the assignee of the partner.,hip : Ansiick v. Bean, A.siynee, 22 Wall.
Tie mere fact that one partner of a firm composed of two partners,
after a stoppage of payment, suffered the other, who had put in twothirds of the capital, and who was in addition a large creditor of the
partnership for money lent, to manage the partnership assets apparently
as if they had been his own, proposing to creditors a compromise at
seventy cents on the dollar, taking the partnership stock, transacting
business in his own name, buying some new stock, selling old and new,
and mingling the funds-though keeping separate accounts-does not,
of itself. dissolve the partnership, and vest such acting partner with the
partnership property in such way as that on a decree of bankruptcy
against him in,ividtally, the partnership assets pass to his assignee in
bankruptcy : id.
PAYMENT.

Acctpthig void Conveyance as a Payment in Ignorance of the Facts.Where a party accepts a deed in payment of a debt, and receipts the
same, in ignorance of the fact thac the deed is a nullity, there being no
such property in existence as it assumes to convey, this will be no paynmnt, and he will not be concluded by his receipt : Anderson v. Armstead, 69 Ill.
RAILItOAD. See CW l)oratio; .Negligence.
lvodification of Contract.Approval by Electors of Connty AidWhere a proposition fir county aid to a railroad upon stipulated conditions has been submitted to the electors of the county and approved by
their vote (under acts like ch. 826, P1. & L. Laws of 1870), such conditions cannot afterwards be essentially modified by any agreement between the railroad company and the board of county supervisors: Suipervisors (f Doughls Co. v. l'albridgc et t., 38 Wis.
here a boy, aged about seven years, was injured while
.\Vgligence.attempting to climb up the ladder of a freight ear while in motion
along a public street in a city, and it appeared that the train was not
being run at an unlawful rate of speed, it moving not faster than four miles
an hour, that the train was properly manned, with every employee at
his station, and that the train was under perfect control, and being run
with the greatest care and eaution, it was held, the company was not
liable : U, B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. Stunips, 69 Ill.
Action for Death of Child-Areglgence of Child or of Plaintf.-In
an action under the statute for injuries to the person of plaintiff's intestate, causing his death (R. S. eh. 135, sees. 12, 13), although the
recovery must be confined to damages of a strictly peciary kind, yet
the jury are not held to any fixed and precise rules in estimating the
amount of damages (within the statutory limit on that subject), but may
compensate all pecuniary injuries, from whatever source they may proceed : Ewen, Adin'r, v. C. & X. W1.Railway Co., 38 Wis.
Where the damages in such an action go to the parents of the deceased,
evidence of their health and estate, and of other facts bearing on the
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probabilities of their needing the services of the deceased, or of their
suffering any actual pecuniary loss from his death, may be submitted to
the jury : Id.
Thus, where the deceased was a boy eight years old, evidence was
competent to show that his mother was a widow, and in poor health;
that she had but little means, and was mainly supported by her friends;
and that she drew a pension of two dollars per month, which was cut
off by the death of the child: Id.
It was not necessary, in such a case, to allege specially, in the complaint, the loss of such pensidn by the mother of the deceased in consequence of his death, in order to render evidence of the fact admissible:
d.
In such an action, where deceased was killed by a locomotive engine
in crossing defendant's railway track, if it were clear from the undisputed
facts, that the boy himself, considering his age and intelligence, did not
exercise proper care in crossing the track, or that, in view of his tender
years, his mother was guilty of contributory negligence in permitting
him to go alone, on the errand upon which he was sent across such track,
the trial court might determine, as a proposition of law, that there could
be no recovery: .d
But where the circumstances leave the inference of negligence in
doubt, and the court is unable to say that upon the most favorable construction for the plaintiff, which can be given to his evidence, there is
nothing to submit to the jury, a nonsuit is improper: 1.
SLANDER.

Words actionableperse.-The complainant in slander avers that the
parties, having been partners in business, agreed to terminate the partnership, but were unable to settle their partnership affairs; that they
submitted the difference arising on their final accounting to arbitrators,
who made a certain award, which is recited; that, notwithstanding such
award, defendant continues to give out that plaintiff greatly cheated
him; and that, at a specified time and place, in the hearing of certain
persons named, defendant said of and concerning plaintiff: "These
books (meaning the firm books of the parties) must be in court. For
he is a swindler and thief, and stole eight thousand dollars from me."

Held, on demurrer, 1. That the words recited, unqualified by averments,
are actionableper se, as they charge a crime. 2. That if it appeared from
the complaint that the words were spoken and understood merely as
charging that plaintiff had made false entries in the account books of

the firm, and in that manner alone had stolen from the defendant, and
in that sense alone was a thief, the words would not be actionable per sp,
and the complaint would be bad for lack of an averment of special
damage: Stern v. Zatz, 38 Wis.
SUBROGATION.

In what Cases it applies.-The doctrine of subrogation in equity is
confined to the relation of principal and surety, and guarantors, and to
cases where a person, to protect his own junior lien, is compelled to remove one which is superior, and to cases of insurers paying losses. In
the first class named. the doctrine is applied to avoid a multiplicity of
suits. In the second class, the person discharging the superior lien is
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treated as its purchaser or assignee, unless the facts show it was intended
as an absolute payment. In the last class, the insurer is subrogated to
the remedies of the assured, upon the ground that upon payment he is
entitled to the property insured as being abandoned by the assured:
Bishop v. 0' Coner, 69 Ill.
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.

Good Faith-Purchase4y Trtustec of Trust Property-ActualFraud
-Lipse of Tim.-Though equity will enforce in the most rigid manner
good faith on the part of a trustee, and vigilantly wath any acquisition
by him in his individual character, of property which has ever been the
subject of his trust, yet where he has sold the trust property to another,
that sale having been judicially confirmed after opposition by the cestui u~e
trust, the fact that thirteen years afterwards he bought the property from
the person to whom he once sold it does not, of necessity, vitiate his
purchase. The question in such a case becomes one of actual fraud.
And where on a bill charging fraud, the answer denies it in the fullest
manner, alleging a purehas lond fide and for full value paid, and that
when he, the trustee, made the sale to the person from whom he has
since bought it, the purchase by himself, now called in question, was
not thought of either by himself or his yendee-the court will not
decree the purchase fraudulent, the ease being heard on the pleadings,
and without any proofs taken : Stephen v. Beale et vx., 22 Wall.
The complainants in this case, who alleged fraud and relied on the
trustee's possession of the trust property after an alleged sale of it, as
evidence of it, not stating when the trustee came into possession-that
is to say, how soon after his former sale-tlle court assumed the time to
be thirteen years ; this term having elapsed' between the date of the sale
by the trustee and the filing of the bill (or cross-bill, rather) to set it
aside ; the court acting on the presumption that the complainant stated
the case as favorably as lie could for himself, and would have mentioned
the fact that trustee had been in possession long before the bill was filed,
if lie had really been so : Id.
Right to claim Conilzensation.-Where a trustee claims compensation
for services, lie must show that lie has discharged the trust; and if the
agreement to pay him out of the fund is disputed, he must establish it
by a preponderance of evidence : Jenkins v. Doolittle, 69 Ill.

ISAAC F. REDFIELD.
As we go to press we receive the announcement by telegraph
of the death, at his residence in Charlestown, Mass., on March
23d, of Hon. ISAAC F. REDFIELD, formerly Chief Justice of Vermont, and for the last fifteen years one of the editors of this journal. We shall present our readers a sketch of this distinguished
jurist in a future number.

